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Abstract
Government pension systems vary widely from country to country. Evidence from
a cross-section of 110 countries indicates that structural di¤erences in public pension
programs are related to reallocation of nancial capital around the world. More specif-
ically, we nd that greater amounts of pension spending are associated with overall
net international indebtedness and a net portfolio characterized by equity assets and
debt liabilities. We present a two-country overlapping-generations model that can
replicate these empirical regularities and elucidate the link between the structure of
pension benets and the resulting portfolio choices of economic agents. In the country
with state-guaranteed pension benets, workers face a lower overall riskiness of lifetime
wealth. As a result, they are willing to invest in risky equity nanced by the selling of
domestic bonds. Workers in the country with no pension system, on the other hand,
tend to be net savers and favor safe debt assets in their portfolios. These ndings can
help to explain the buildup of global nancial imbalances over the last three decades
as well as to analyze future changes in capital allocation patterns due to the ongoing
pension system reforms in many developing and developed countries.
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1 Introduction
It is a well-established fact in the eld of international nance that cross-border ows of
nancial capital and the accompanying current account imbalances in many countries have
been on the rise for at least three decades. Following the "savings glut" argument advanced
by Bernanke (2005) suggesting that high savings rates in the developing economies have
been driving nancial capital into the United States and the publication of the large-scale
database of foreign assets and liabilities by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), many researchers
have become attracted to the detailed examination of the causes of these imbalances. A closer
look shows that there are signicant di¤erences in the size and composition of international
portfolio holdings among di¤erent groups of countries: while Asian and oil-exporting coun-
tries have been, on average, accumulating (net) international assets, most OECD countries
have gone deeper into debt. Many developed countries, including Canada, Italy, and the
USA, have debt liabilities o¤set by equity assets, while the pattern is reversed in, among
others, China, Ireland, and Saudi Arabia. Figure 1 demonstrates these trends in the USA,
the United Kingdom, and China.
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Figure 1: Trends in the stocks of international asset holdings of the UK, the U.S., and China
over the past four decades.
The causes of this capital reallocation can be studied in two complementary ways: by
focusing on aggregate cross-border nancial ows and by examining individual portfolio
choices. The former approach has identied many macroeconomic factors driving capital
ows into or out of a country, such as exchange rate arrangements, nancial liberalization,
political and institutional risk, and di¤erences in GDP growth rates.1 The latter course
1Some examples from the large and growing literature include Bacchetta and Wincoop (2000), Gournichas
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suggests that lifecycle and precautionary savings motives in the face of the varying degrees
of idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, as well as di¤erences in nancial instrument availability,
can help to explain the growing international imbalances.2 Our paper adds to this list by
showing that the interaction between personal savings motives and the particular structure
of a government-run pension system has a direct impact on the dynamics of international
capital ows. This line of inquiry is particularly important in light of the forthcoming
demographic changes around the world (increases in longevity and declines in fertility) and
the corresponding public policy debates on the sustainability and the need for reform of the
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems that currently exist in most developed countries. Given the
multitude of international linkages among countries, national policies should no longer be
examined in a closed economy setting: the international mobility of nancial capital will
modify the e¤ects of such policies vis-à-vis a world composed of autarkies.
There exists a great deal of heterogeneity in the availability and structure of pension
systems around the world, varying along many dimensions such as the degree of coverage
(number of workers contributing to the system), replacement rates (ratio of benets to the
average wage), qualications for receiving pension payments, and the type of funding (pay-as-
you-go versus fully funded).3 It is entirely plausible that the particular design of a pension
system inuences workers consumption-savings decisions and has a direct impact on the
composition of their investment portfolios. In fact, in papers closely related to ours, Börsch-
Supan et al. (2006), Eugeni (2013), and Samwick (2000) demonstrate that the pension
system structure has a signicant impact on individual savings behavior and through it on
the aggregate foreign asset position of a country. More specically, the latter two papers
show that countries with PAYG pension systems tend to be net borrowers. We pursue this
line of inquiry further by considering not just the overall net asset position that may result
from the pension system asymmetry, but also the particular portfolio composition (debt and
equity assets and liabilities).
Based on a cross-section of 110 countries, we nd evidence that net equity and net
debt positions are inuenced by the magnitude of public pension spending; countries with
more generous pension systems tend on the net to invest in equity and borrow using debt
instruments. Insofar as equity typically carries a higher degree of risk than bonds, higher
pension benets appear to encourage riskier investment strategies. To further test this
relationship, we construct a simple measure of portfolio risk, calculated as net equity less
net debt relative to a countrys gross assets and liabilities. The measure is positive when a
country invests in equity and borrows in bonds, and becomes negative in the opposite case;
using this metric, we can say that the U.S. has a higher degree of portfolio risk than, for
example, China. Empirical analysis of our dataset shows that portfolio risk is positively and
statistically signicantly related to a countrys pension benets.
Motivated by these empirical regularities, we build a two-country, two-cohort overlap-
ping generations model with internationally traded debt and equity assets to understand
and Rey (2007), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008), Neumann et al. (2009), Forbes and Warnock (2012),
Fratzscher (2012), and de Araujo et al. (2014).
2In, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Devereux (2009), and Mendoza et al. (2009).
3Whitehouse (2007), Barr and Diamond (2010), and Social Security Administrations "Social Security
Programs Throughout the World," ( http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/, last accessed on
09/16/2014) o¤er a comprehensive overview of pension system features around the world.
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the relationship between the magnitude of pension guarantees and the resulting portfolio
choices of workers. We focus on the PAYG system that characterizes the majority of coun-
tries with state pensions, and assume that it is available in one of the two countries (which
we subsequently refer to as developed), whereas the workers in the other (developing) econ-
omy have to make their own retirement savings arrangements. In their rst period of life,
consumers in each country earn wages and invest a portion of their earnings into an array of
home and foreign equity and bond assets. In the developed country, the government levies
a tax on current workers and distributes the proceeds to retirees. During the second (and
last) period, the old cohorts simply consume the pension payment and the payout of their
period-one portfolio investment. The asymmetry in the pension system availability between
the two countries produces three key e¤ects on the composition of consumer portfolios in
the model:
1. The gross international assets and liabilities held by both countries rise relative to the
benchmark case of no pension system in either economy.
2. The developed country has a lower net foreign asset position than the developing
economy.
3. The portfolio risk measure is higher in the developed country, suggesting that a govern-
ment guarantee of pension benets encourages riskier portfolio choices by the workers.
The decrease in net foreign assets of the developed country is caused by a change in the
holdings of both debt and equity; two mechanisms drive these results. First, the introduction
of a PAYG pension system (in the developed economy) generates a very strong wealth e¤ect
for the young cohort, which loses a fraction of its current income via the pension tax, but
is guaranteed a payment in the next period. Consequently, the workers borrow from abroad
(using both equity and debt) to supplement their current consumption, resulting in a negative
net foreign asset position of the home country. Second, the dened benet structure of
the retirement system reduces the overall riskiness of the home consumerslifetime wealth,
by replacing risky returns on the stochastic rst-period wage income with a government-
guaranteed second-period pension payment. The resulting risk rebalancing e¤ect causes the
young home cohort to increase the risk level of its rst-period portfolio by nancing equity
investment through selling of home bonds; this shift is reected in the higher portfolio risk
measure of the home economy.
Given the commonly used calibration of the model parameters, the strength of the wealth
e¤ect is much greater than that of the risk rebalancing e¤ect, and home net equity remains
negative. By replacing the CRRA preferences in the utility function with Epstein-Zin pref-
erences, we are able to vary consumer attitudes toward within-period risk (and thus the
strength of the risk rebalancing e¤ect) separately from their preferences for cross-period
consumption smoothing (which control the magnitude of the wealth e¤ect). By increas-
ing the agentsrisk aversion and the degree of substitutability between current and future
consumption quite within range of available empirical estimates we are able to transfer a
large share of the risky equity holdings from the foreign to the home household and replicate
the aforementioned "venture capitalist" (positive net equity accompanied by negative net
debt) portfolio prole of countries with well-established government pension systems.
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In a related line of research, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) show that the growing
levels of international debt liabilities of the developed economies (and especially of the U.S.)
result from the lack of safe store-of-value assets originating in the developing countries; the
latter are therefore forced to seek out U.S. government bonds to diversify their portfolios. We
add to this nding by endogenizing the need of less developed economies to seek relatively
safe nancial assets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents and discusses
some empirical regularities in international data. We then outline the two-country model
and describe the links between the government pension guarantees and the resulting portfolio
decisions of households. We proceed to report our ndings from the model simulations and
nally o¤er some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2 Estimating the impact of pensions on portfolio deci-
sions
Retirement-income systems around the world are very diverse, varying from non-contributory
universal coverage (sometimes known as social) pensions, dened-contribution plans (ranging
from unfunded PAYG to fully funded systems) in which the payout depends on a workers
contribution to the system, and voluntary private pension plans; it is quite common to see
a combination of several such programs in most economies. The structure, coverage, and
replacement rates of a pension system are likely to have a direct impact on the consumption-
savings behavior of households. Although a priori the reaction of the private sector to the
structure of the pension systems is ambiguous, cross-country empirical evidence suggests that
PAYG systems tend to crowd out private savings (Samwick, 2000; Feldstein and Liebman,
2002). In a theoretical setting, Eugeni (2013) demonstrates that a country with a more
advanced pension system will become an international net borrower. Pursuing this line
of questioning further, we want to understand the relationship between the structure of a
countrys pension system and the resulting portfolio decisions (equity and debt borrowing
and lending) of the consumers. It is reasonable to hypothesize that, with the promise of
generous retirement benet payouts, an individual during her working years will choose a
more risky portfolio of assets (skewed toward equity assets and perhaps even debt liabilities).
Conversely, in a country that has a very limited or no pension system, consumers are forced
to save for their retirement individually, and therefore will tend to invest in relatively safe
assets.
We test this hypothesis by studying the relationship between international capital stocks
and pension spending in a cross-section of 110 countries (listed in Appendix C) in 2010.
Let A = fNE;ND;NFAg capture the three di¤erent measures of international capital
stocks: net equity, net debt, and net foreign assets, respectively. Our regression is specied
as follows:
Y = + PS +  0X+ " (1)
where Y is one of the variables contained inA, PS captures total pension spending (adjusted
for international purchasing power di¤erences), and X is a vector of control variables dened
below; we estimate the model using ordinary least squares. Our main focus is on the sign of
5
, which measures the directional impact of the size of the pension benets on the resulting
international asset holdings, with the prior that the coe¢ cient is positive for net equity
and negative for both net debt and net foreign wealth. Below we briey describe the three
measures of capital stocks and the control variables used in our study; detailed descriptions,
sources, and summary statistics of all variables are reported in Appendix C.
The data on international capital holdings are taken from Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2007)
Mark II dataset, which contains various annual measures of international debt and equity
assets and liabilities for 179 countries between 1970 and 2011. The overall volume of cross-
border nancial instruments (GAL), measured as the sum of gross assets and liabilities,
captures the degree of a countrys involvement in the international asset markets. Net equity
(NE) and net debt (ND) gauge the degree of riskiness of the portfolio. Finally, net foreign
assets (NFA) capture the overall position (positive or negative) of a country vis-à-vis its
foreign creditors and debtors.
Estimating equity and debt positions separately, however, paints only a partial picture
of the riskiness of a countrys international investment position. Therefore, we construct
a portfolio risk index PR which measures the general riskiness of a portfolio based on the
assumption that equity investments carry more risk than debt assets:
PR =
NE  ND
GAL
=
(EA  EL)  (DA DL)
(EA+ EL) + (DA+DL)
Here EA, EL, DA, and DL represent equity assets and liabilities and debt assets and
liabilities, respectively. By construction, PR, which captures the distributions of net equity
and debt in a single variable, ranges from  1 to 1. At the negative extreme, PR =  1
represents the safest portfolio with all liabilities in equity instruments (so that EA = 0 and
EL > 0) and all assets in debt instruments (DA > 0 and DL = 0). Conversely, PR = 1
corresponds to the riskiest portfolio with all assets in equity instruments and all liabilities
in debt instruments. Based on our hypothesis, we expect the index to be positively related
to the generosity of the pension system.
In our estimation, we control for several other factors that could inuence international
capital allocations and for additional features of the pension system that can a¤ect consumer
portfolio decisions.
The standard approach to analyzing cross-border capital stocks is to measure them rel-
ative to GDP. We do not follow this methodology here because countries with low levels of
GDP may bias our results. For example, if one billion dollars is transferred from the U.S.
to Luxembourg, it counts equally in our measures of both countriescapital holdings. If,
on the other hand, we were to measure these stocks as percent of GDP, the transfer would
represent less than a hundredth of a percent change in the U.S. international position but
more than a two percent change in that of Luxembourg. Thus, expressing asset holdings in
relative terms may overstate the importance of small countries in global nancial markets
and therefore bias our results.4 Moreover, Martin and Rey (2004) note that country size, in
and of itself, has a positive e¤ect on the number and the variety of assets it produces, and
Campos and Kinoshita (2010) nd that larger market size (proxied by GDP) does attract
more foreign direct investment.
4Haiti received approximately $7.5 billion in aid in the two years since its devastating earthquake in 2010;
this capital inow is almost equal to Haitis annual output.
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Generally, we would expect the size of the economy to inuence its aggregate saving
and borrowing decisions. We include both aggregate GDP (adjusted for purchasing power
parity), GDPppp, and population POP in our set of control variables. Used together, the
two variables capture the level of macroeconomic development of a country and the corre-
sponding need for banking services, and also proxy for the strength of its institutions and
infrastructure. We include the volume of trade (V OL) in our regressions since, from the bal-
ance of payments identity, countries that are more heavily engaged in international trade will
necessarily experience a larger ow of cross-border assets. Finally, de Araujo et al. (2014)
demonstrate that nancial liberalization has a direct impact on the reallocation of nan-
cial capital across borders; we therefore include Heritage Foundations Index of Economic
Freedom (HFI) in our regression analysis.
As for other pension system and demographic features that might prove important for the
consumption-savings decisions, we include life expectancy of both men and women at birth
(LEm and LEw), the fraction of retirees in total population (RETc), contribution rates
CONT (to pension programs, as a percent of earnings), and the rate of coverage COV ,
which measures the total number of active contributors relative to the working age popu-
lation. Higher life expectancy should generally encourage savings (for longer retirement).
Controlling for the fraction of retirees addresses the observation that older countries, such
as Germany or Japan, tend to be net savers, whereas younger countries, such as India or
Mexico, typically have nonzero international debt; see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) for
empirical evidence. Higher contribution and coverage rates are expected to decrease overall
savings rates since workers treat expected future pension payouts as a positive wealth e¤ect.
Finally, we identify two subgroups of countries whose idiosyncratic characteristics intro-
duce additional mechanisms driving pension spending and capital accumulation. The nine
members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) included in our
sample have been accumulating net foreign wealth (which many of them have been investing
in safe foreign bonds) due to the sharp increase in oil prices that started in the early 2000s.
The post-communist Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have inherited pen-
sion systems that are much more generous relative to their per capita income that those in
the rest of the sample.
Results of all estimations, reported only for the control variables found to be signicant
in at least one specication, are displayed in Table 1. We nd that the e¤ects of pension
spending on the composition and riskiness of the countriesportfolios are statistically sig-
nicant and do support our main conjectures. The only notable exception is the coe¢ cient
on the net foreign assets, which has the right sign but is not statistically signicant. It
is perhaps not surprising that we cannot reproduce exactly the results in Samwick (2000),
since aside from the di¤erent sample and time coverage we are using NFA rather than
gross national savings as the dependent variable. Thus, behavior of domestic investment
drives a wedge between the two measures and may thereby a¤ect the relationship between
retirement payouts and the preferred gauge of savings.
In the next section, we develop a theoretical model that can explain the links between the
features of a pension system and the resulting investment-savings decisions of the households.
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3 The two-country OLG framework
At its core, the model contains the following key features necessary to understand the impact
of pensions on the international capital allocations: two economies with incomplete nancial
markets, four internationally-traded assets (two stocks and two bonds), two internationally-
traded goods (home and foreign), and two cohorts of consumers (workers and retirees) in each
country. Incomplete markets are needed to allow for uctuations in the distribution of wealth
between the two countries, and the menu of four assets allows us to study both gross and
net equity and debt positions. The presence of two goods enriches the model environment
by adding the real exchange rate adjustment mechanism following country-specic shocks.
The two economies di¤er only in their pension system setup. The home country has a two-
tier pension system. In the rst tier, the government administers a pure PAYG social security
system, in which each period a portion of the workersstochastic earnings are transferred
to the retirees. We consider two versions of the PAYG framework: dened benet (DB),
modeled as a xed lump-sum tax on the workers, and dened contribution (DC), represented
by a xed proportional tax on wages. Generally (and in our model), there are no investment
decisions in pure unfunded PAYG systems and thus asset return risk is absent.5 However,
since we require the pension policy to be balanced, so that the taxes are exactly equal to
the payouts each period, under the DC setup the income risk to the retirees comes from the
income risk of the current generation of workers. The second tier represents fully-funded
voluntary private savings. The foreign economy, on the other hand, has only the second tier
pensions such that each worker makes individual savings and investment decisions during
the working years and collects the corresponding returns upon retirement.
Computing a solution to our model economy is a non-trivial task; therefore, certain
aspects of reality that, although potentially important, play no role in our framework. In
the model described below we abstract from demographics trends, the role of government
debt in supporting the functioning of the pension system, international macroeconomic and
institutional asymmetries, and intra-cohort heterogeneity.
It might be helpful, given the somewhat heavy notation needed to describe the model,
to note at this stage that in the rest of the paper superscripts are used to denote agent-
specic variables (country of residence and period of birth), whereas subscripts will refer to
economy-wide indicators such as country of production and the time period.
3.1 Production
For simplicity, and to reduce the number of state variables, we model both countries as en-
dowment economies. Perishable output of each country is comprised of wages and dividends,
yh;t = wh;t + dh;t
yf;t = wf;t + df;t,
5In a partially funded PAYG system, social security tax revenue in excess of pension payments is typically
invested in safe assets. For example, in the U.S. the program surplus is placed in the Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds, which held about $2.8 trillion in asset reserves
by the end of June 2015. All securities held by the two trust funds must, by law, be issued by the federal
government; the trust fund investments earn a market rate of interest.
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each of which is in turn determined exogenously by a two-state Markov process. Thus, home
wages wh;t can be either low, Wh;1, or high, Wh;2, and evolve according to the following
symmetric transition matrix:
P (wh;t = Wh;1jwh;t 1 = Wh;1) = P (wh;t = Wh;2jwh;t 1 = Wh;2) = w;h:
Home dividends, foreign wages, and foreign dividends follow analogous processes with pa-
rameters fDh;1; Dh;2; d;hg, fWf;1;Wf;2; w;fg, and fDf;1; Df;2; d;fg, respectively. We link
the two economies by assuming that the two dividend processes are correlated, and use the
parameter d;d = Corr (dh;t; df;t) to control the strength of the relationship.
6
The two outputs are combined into aggregate bundles, available for consumption to home
and foreign agents, according to the CES aggregators
yht =
h
1 h;t
 
yhh;t

+
 
1  h;t
1   
yhf;t
i 1
(2)
yft =
h
1 f;t

yff;t

+
 
1  f;t
1  
yfh;t
i 1
and
yhh;t + y
f
h;t = yh;t
yff;t + y
h
f;t = yf;t
The time-varying parameter h;t (f;t in the foreign country) captures the extent of home
bias in consumption, and  measures the elasticity of substitution between imports and
exports. We assume that
h;t = h + et
f;t = f + et
where et is an i.i.d. process with et 2 f e; eg.
We dene the exogenous state of the economy as zt = fet; wh;t; wf;t; dh;t; df;tg, which
follows a rst-order Markov process with nitely many states, Z = fz1; :::; z32g.
Given the prices Ph;t and Pf;t, measured in local currency, of the home and foreign output,
and assuming that the Law of One Price holds, the two countriesCPIs are
P ht =
h
h;t (Ph;t)

 1 +
 
1  h;t

(StPf;t)

 1
i 1

(3)
P ft =
h
f;t (Pf;t)

 1 +
 
1  f;t
  
S 1t Ph;t
 
 1
i 1

; (4)
where St is the nominal exchange rate, expressed in units of home currency per one unit of
foreign currency. In the rest of the paper, we normalize all home (foreign) prices on the home
(foreign) CPI, and refer to them using lower-case letters; we also dene the real exchange
rate as qt  StP
f
t
Pht
.7
6Appendix A describes the relationship between the parameters d;d, d;h, and d;f .
7Since we use our model to understand the dynamics of real prices and quantities, we could have alter-
natively designated the price of, for example, the home good as the numeraire and abstracted from nominal
variables altogether. However, allowing each country to have its own currency results in a symmetric solution
grid, which simplies the interpretation of our results.
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3.2 Consumers
Consumers live for two periods (working years and retirement), and a new generation is born
in every period. Consumers are representative within each cohort: the (young) workers born
in period t and the (old) retirees born in period t   1. We assume zero population growth
rate, so that the size of the two cohorts, normalized to unity, is the same in all periods. The
young cohort starts with no wealth, earns wages, pays social security taxes (rst pillar of the
pension system), and saves a portion of its disposable income for retirement (second pillar).
The old cohort consumes all of its savings, dividend income, and pension benets.
The home workers born in period t derive utility from current and future consumption:
U

ch;tt ; c
h;t
t+1

=

ch;tt
1 
1   + E
264

ch;tt+1
1 
1  
375 (5)
The superscripts h and t denote the agents country of residence and period of birth (which
also indicates the agents cohort), and the two consumption bundles ch;tt and c
h;t
t+1 are aggre-
gated from home and foreign goods as in (2).
The workers maximize utility (5) by investing a portion of their disposable wage income
into the four available assets. Note that since the old cohort consumes all of its income, the
following notation pertains to the asset holdings of the young cohort. Each unit of home
(foreign) stock ah;t (af;t) with the corresponding price qh;t (qf;t) entitles its holder to dh;t+1
(df;t+1) units of the home (foreign) good in the following period. Home (foreign) bonds bh;t
(bf;t), measured in the units of home (foreign) consumption bundles, o¤er real rates of return
equal to 1+ rh;t (1+ rf;t). We assume that each country has one unit of stock and that both
bonds are in zero net supply. The workers choose their period-t consumption ch;tt and the
allocations ah;th;t, a
h;t
f;t, b
h;t
h;t, and b
h;t
f;t subject to the following budget constraints:
ch;tt + b
h;t
h;t + qtb
h;t
f;t + qh;ta
h;t
h;t + qtqf;ta
h;t
f;t = 

h;t
t   Iht (6)
ch;tt+1 = 

h;t
t+1 + I
h
t+1 (7)
The period-t wealth 
h;tt of the representative worker is equal to her disposable wage:

h;tt  ph;t [(1  h)wh;t   Th] (8)
The government can collect social security contributions from the workers in two ways:
as a lump-sum tax Th (restricted to be Th < wh;1) or as a fraction h < 1 of the wage,
corresponding to the pure DB and pure DC setups of the PAYG system. In the next section,
we consider the two frameworks separately: Th > 0 and h = 0 in the rst and vice versa
in the second. In either case, we assume that the policy is balanced so that in each period
the taxes are equal to the transfers given to the old cohort. Thus, each consumers second
period wealth 
h;tt+1 is the sum of the social security transfers and the payouts of the period-t
investments:

h;tt+1  ph;t+1 (hwh;t+1 + Th)| {z }
Pension payment
+ (9)
(1 + rh;t) b
h;t
h;t + qt+1 (1 + rf;t) b
h;t
f;t + (qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1) a
h;t
h;t + qt+1 (qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1) a
h;t
f;t| {z }
Retuns on nancial investments
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Thus, in our model the pension system allows households to share risks across generations
and (indirectly, by inuencing the young cohorts portfolio choice) across countries. As we
demonstrate below, the choice of DB versus DC system is critical for our models ability to
replicate the four empirical trends documented in Section 2: in the presence of stochastic
wages, it a¤ects the risk prole of lifetime income di¤erently. In the DB framework, the
government collects a xed amount from the stochastic income of the young cohort and
thereby makes the rst-period disposable income more volatile while reducing the volatility
of the retireesincome. The DC framework, on the other hand, increases the riskiness of the
old-cohort income by directly linking it to the workersuctuating wages.8
We allow agents to go short in all assets; however, to guarantee the compactness of the
model state space, we require that their next period wealth 
h;tt+1 cannot be negative:
min
h;tt+1  0 (10)
This constraint implies that the workers can use their future social security payments as
collateral in borrowing. The constraint (10) can also be interpreted as a borrowing constraint
on domestic bond holdings bh;th;t:
bh;th;t 
1
1 + rh;t
min fph;t+1 (hwh;t+1 + Th) + qt+1 (1 + rf;t) bh;tf;t + (11)
(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1) a
h;t
h;t + qt+1 (qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1) a
h;t
f;tg
Thus, the worker may not borrow more using domestic bonds than her next-period pension
payments plus returns on other assets in the worst possible state of nature.
Since compactness restriction (10) allows the starting wealth of the old cohort to be
strictly zero (captured by the indicator variable Iht = 1), the uncomfortable implication is
that consumption ch;tt+1 in equation (7) can be zero as well. To avoid this, we assume that
in such a case the government implements a lump-sum relief transfer  from the young to
the old generation; it is the model equivalent of the so-called "social pensions," which in
many countries guarantee a minimum standard of living to the retired persons. The transfer
cannot be used as collateral in borrowing. We set Iht = 0 if the old cohorts starting wealth

h;tt+1 is positive.
The problem of the foreign consumers is analogous, with the exception that Tf =  f = 0,
eliminating the rst PAYG pillar of the pension system. However, the foreign economy has
the same "social pension" system ( > 0 for Ift = 1) to guarantee that the consumption of
the old cohort is always positive.
3.3 Closing the model
We assume that the monetary authority in each country follows the policy of strict CPI
ination targeting so that
P ht+1
P ht
=
P ft+1
P ft
= 1 8t (12)
8Out of 176 national mandatory pension schemes around the world, two thirds may be classied as DB.
About half of all the systems operate on an unfunded (or PAYG) basis, with an additional 25 percent being
partially funded. (Source: Pallares-Miralles et al., 2012.)
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The state of nature of the model economy in period t is given by the beginning-of-period
wealth distribution of the two cohorts of retirees, 
h;t 1t and 

f;t 1
t , the ve exogenous
shocks zt = fet; wh;t; wf;t; dh;t; df;tg, tax policies T = fTh; Tf ; h;  f ; g, and monetary policies
M given by (12). Given the state of nature, a competitive equilibrium is a price system
Pt  fqt; ph;t; pf;t; qh;t; qf;t; rr;t; rf;tg, an allocation of goods Ct 
n
ch;tt ; c
h;t 1
t ; c
f;t
t ; c
f;t 1
t
o
, and
asset positions At 
n
ah;th;t; a
f;t
h;t; a
h;t
f;t; a
f;t
f;t; b
h;t
h;t; b
f;t
h;t; b
h;t
f;t; b
f;t
f;t
o
such that
1. given the price system, the allocation and asset positions solve the home and foreign
consumersutility maximization problems, and
2. nancial and goods markets clear:
ch;tt + c
h;t 1
t = y
h
t (13)
cf;tt + c
f;t 1
t = y
f
t (14)
ah;th;t + a
f;t
h;t = a
h;t
f;t + a
f;t
f;t = 1 (15)
bh;th;t + b
f;t
h;t = b
h;t
f;t + b
f;t
f;t = 0 (16)
3.4 Solution method
The model is solved globally over a compact state-space grid, following the methodology
outlined in Stepanchuk and Tsyrennikov (2015). Du¢ e et al. (1994) show that a unique
recursive equilibrium exists in these types of models if the state space is su¢ ciently rich (in
other words, includes enough equilibrium variables to describe the current state of nature).
Even if the model possesses a unique equilibrium, it may be very di¢ cult to solve com-
putationally in the presence of a large number of endogenous state variables (the so-called
"curse of dimensionality"). To minimize computational time, we reduce the number of en-
dogenous state variables to one through a series of variable re-denitions. By examining the
models equilibrium equations (listed in Appendix B), we see that the only endogenous state
variables are the portfolio choices and their associated prices, contained in the sets At and
Pt. However, we do not need to keep track of these variables individually; we only need the
aggregate value of portfolio holdings of the four agents, which we have already dened as
wealth levels
n

h;tt ;

h;t 1
t ;

f;t
t ;

f;t 1
t
o
. Moreover, since the young cohort is born into the
model without any inherited assets, their wealths 
h;tt and 

f;t
t are determined in period t
and therefore need not be carried over as state variables. Thus, we only need to keep track
of the evolution of the wealths of the two old cohorts, 
h;t 1t and 

f;t 1
t . By combining the
two variables, we see that their sum, dened as 
t 1t  
h;t 1t + 
f;t 1t , is also determined
contemporaneously based on exogenous states and period-t control variables:

t 1t = ph;t (hwh;t + Th) + pf;t ( fwf;t + Tf ) + (qh;t + ph;tdh;t) + qt (qf;t + pf;tdf;t) (17)
Finally, we conclude that the only endogenous state variable we must track across periods
is the measure of the distribution of wealth between the retired cohorts:
!h;t 1t 

h;t 1t

t 1t
(18)
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The borrowing constraint (10) guarantees the compactness of the state space and restricts
the wealth ratio !h;t 1t to lie within the [0; 1] interval.
Given !h;t 1t and the exogenous state variables, we can recover the two wealths of the
home and foreign old cohorts using (17). The two wealths of the young cohorts and all of
the control variables Pt, At, and Ct can be expressed as functions of the exogenous state zt,
tax and monetary policies T and M , and the one endogenous state variable !h;t 1t .
We dene the state space of the model and the endogenous variables, respectively, as
st 
n
!h;t 1t ; zt
o
xt  fPt; Ct; Atg
where the sets are contained in the space
S : [0; 1]Z
X : R7+ R4+ R8+
Additionally, we establish a transition map for the wealth distribution !h;tt+1 = O (st; zt+1),
such that O : S  ! [0; 1]32. We then use a recursive process to nd the optimal policy
function  : S  ! X such that
0 = E

	

 (s) ; s; [ (s (z0) ; z0) ; s (z0) ; z0]z02Z
	 js
s (z0) = O (s; z0)
where 	 is a system of equilibrium conditions listed in Appendix B. The rst of the above
two expressions solves the model equations given the current and future state and control
variables, and the second is the transition equation for the endogenous state variable !h;t 1t .
The solution grid is dened over a number of uniform steps, n, on the home retirees
wealth ratio !h;t 1t , such that the step size is
1
n 1 ; thus, the grid space is n  32. At each
grid point, we make an initial guess for the policy function  (s) and then use B-spline
interpolation to approximate the future value of the wealth distribution, !h;tt+1. The use of
homotopy eliminates the possibly of asset returns becoming collinear during the minimization
procedure, as outlined by Schmedders (1998), and the Garcia-Zangwill (1981) redenition of
Lagrange multipliers allows for corner solutions when the Euler equations fail to hold. We
iterate on the policy function  (s) until the di¤erence between the optimal function matrices
of the two most recent iterations becomes su¢ ciently small:
 i (s)   i 1 (s) < 10 5. A
detailed description of the solution method can be found in Appendix B.
Given the structural complexity of the portfolio choice problem, the analytical derivation
of consumer decision rules is very cumbersome. We instead rely on numerical simulations
of the model to uncover the channels that link the national choice of the pension system
to the resulting patterns of international capital holdings. We next describe the choice of
parameter values used to generate our results.
3.5 Calibration
The benchmark specication is described in Table 2; unless otherwise indicated, all parame-
ters describing the foreign economy are identical to the ones in the home country.
14
Each period in the model is taken to represent 25 years; thus, we assume that each worker
starts his life and career at the age of 25, retires at the age of 50, and lives until the age of
75. We set the intertemporal discount factor  = 0:375; given the 4% annual real rate of
return (r) commonly assumed in the business cycle literature and the 25-year duration of
each period in our model (T ), the parameter  solves (1 + r)T =  1. We assume log utility
by setting  = 1; however, below we perform a robustness check by increasing the value of
this parameter.
We assume that home and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption,  =
1=3, and let the average home bias parameters be h = f = 0:75. The degree of trade
openness changes by 5% relative to the average, so that fe1; e2g = f 0:05; 0:05g.
Table 2: Benchmark parameter values
Parameter Description Value
 Intertemporal discount factor 0:375
 Relative risk aversion coe¢ cient 1
h; f Average consumption home bias 0:75
 Import/export elasticity of substitution 1=3
Wi;1;W i;2 Wage realizations for i 2 fh; fg 0:745; 1:255
Di;1; Di;2 Dividend realizations for i 2 fh; fg 0:257; 0:592
i;w Persistence in the wage process for i 2 fh; fg 0:522
i;d Persistence in the dividend process for i 2 fh; fg 0:513
Th Pension tax, lump sum (with h = 0) f0:10; 0:28; 0:47g
h Pension tax, distortionary (with Th = 0) f0:124; 0:362; 0:599g
We use the moments of the annual series for U.S. compensation of employees and capital
income (expressed in real per capita terms and HP-ltered) to calibrate the processes for
model wages and dividends. To this end, we set h;w = 0:522 and h;d = 0:513, equivalent to
the annual wage and dividend autocorrelations of 0:62 and 0:47, respectively. We normalize
the average wage and dividend in each country to 1 and 0:42 to match the share of capital to
labor income in the U.S. Based on this normalization, we set fWh;1;Wh;2g = f0:745; 1:255g
and fDh;1;Dh;2g = f0:257; 0:592g to produce the volatilities observed in the data.9
We consider two di¤erent versions of the model: DB, with the lump-sum pension tax
Th > 0 (and h = 0), and DC with only a distortionary tax h > 0 (and Th = 0). The
calibration of the pension taxes and benets is somewhat convoluted by the assumption that
there is an equal number of workers and retirees in our model.
In the DB setup, we can interpret the variable Th as the total pension benet. According
to World Bank HDNSP pensions database, the ratio of pension spending to GDP in the U.S.
is 6:8 percent; therefore, we set Th = 0:068Yh = 0:10, where Yh = 12 (Wh;1 +Dh;1 +Wh;2 +Dh;2)
is the average realization of home output. This parameterization carries with it the uncom-
fortable implication that, on average, the benets per retiree (also described in our model by
Th) are equal to 6:8 percent of income per person (equal to Yh), which of course is much lower
9Appendix A o¤ers a more detailed explanation of our calibration strategy for wages and dividends. Data
sources and descriptions are listed in Appendix C.
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than in the data.10 Alternatively, we can start with the model equilibrium condition that the
tax per worker is equal to the benet per retiree. If we dene ah as the ratio of retirees per
workers, then ahTh is equal to the total pension benets. We set ah = 0:207 equal to the U.S.
old-age dependency ratio,11 and calibrate Th = 0:0680:207Yh = 0:47. Although we better match
the retiree benets at 33 percent of per capita income, the workers in the model now pay
the corresponding 33 percent social security income tax. Below we simulate the model using
both calibrations, and also consider the average case of Th = 12
 
0:068
0:207
+ 0:068

Yh = 0:28.
In the DC version, we set h equal to the contribution rate for old age, disability, and
survivors social security programs, which in the U.S. is equal to 12:4 percent of wage income.12
Analogous to the logic of the preceding paragraph, this calibration results in too-low benets
for the retirees. If we instead try to match the latter, we can rescale the tax rate by the
dependency ratio and set h = 0:1240:207 = 0:599; in this case, the social security tax levied on
the workers is much higher than in the data. We consider both of these calibrations, as well
as the average parameterization h = 12
 
0:124
0:207
+ 0:124

= 0:362.
4 Impact of pension systems on consumer portfolio
choice
We begin our analysis of the results by simulating the model four times: once with no
pension system in either economy (we refer to this as the benchmark specication), and
then by considering the three baseline levels of the lump sum social security taxes in the
home economy: Th = f0:10; 0:28; 0:47g. Each specication is simulated 1,000 times for 1,100
periods starting at the symmetric time-zero cross-country wealth distribution 
h;tt +

h;t 1
t =

f;tt +

f;t 1
t ; we discard the rst 100 time periods so that the initial conditions do not impact
the overall results.
Table 3 displays the results of the simulations for the ve variables of interest: GALh=GDP h,
NEh=GDP h, NDh=GDP h, NFAh=GPDh, and PRh. We do not report the impact of wage
and dividend shocks directly, since our model cannot generate impulse response functions
(the shocks have no steady-state or long-run equilibrium values). Instead, the data in the
table are generated by computing the average of each variable over the 1,000 periods in
each simulation, and then nding the mean and standard deviation of the average across the
simulations.
Column 1 of Table 3 describes the benchmark specication; when countries are symmetric
in all aspects, consumers do not trade bonds internationally. Cross-border trade in equity is
relatively limited as households risk-share internationally only to smooth out country-specic
shocks. With the exception of gross asset and liability holdings, all variables of interest are
on average not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
10According to Whitehouse (2007), the pre-tax and post-tax replacement rates (the percentage of a workers
pre-retirement income paid out by a pension program after retirement) for the average male in the U.S. are
40 and 50 percent, respectively.
11The exact denition of the old-age dependency ratio used by the U.S. Social Security administration is
Population aged 65 or older
Population aged 18-64 . Source: The Statistical Abstract of the United States 2012, Table 17 (Age Depen-
dency Ratios by State: 2000 and 2010)
12Source: Social Security Administration, "Social Security Programs Throughout the World."
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Table 3: Averages of international asset positions of the home economy
Home lump sum tax Th
0:00 0:10 0:28 0:47
GALh=GDP h 0.1924 0.2025 0.2194 0.2327
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0013)
NEh=GDP h -0.0011b -0.0073 -0.0182 -0.0299
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
NDh=GDP h 0.0000b -0.0144 -0.0396 -0.0658
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005)
NFAh=GPDh -0.0011b -0.0217 -0.0578 -0.0957
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0014)
PRh 0.0026b 0.0411 0.1018 0.1563
(0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0025)
Notes. (a): Standard errors in parentheses.
(b): all statistics except those marked with the superscript b are signicant at the 1 percent
level.
We introduce a pension system into (only) the home economy in columns 24. The
increase in the lump-sum tax on the workers (and the corresponding increase in the retirees
benet payments) generates several trends in the simulated data. First, as the consumers
in both countries adjust to the asymmetry, gross trade in assets grows in volume. Second,
the home households borrow from abroad using both equity and bond instruments. Third,
the net foreign assets of the home country become progressively more negative. Finally, the
portfolio risk prole indicator PRh of the home economy increases. With the exception of the
symmetric benchmark case (in column 1), all statistics reported in Table 3 are signicantly
di¤erent from zero at the 1 percent level.
Before examining the mechanisms behind these trends below, we consider their variability.
Table 4 presents the average standard deviation of each variable across the simulations. Two
noteworthy regularities emerge from the data as the pension systems size is increased: (1)
the higher volatility of the gross and net asset positions (GALh=GDP h and NFAh=GPDh,
respectively) is driven almost entirely by more volatile bond holdings; and (2) the volatility
of portfolio risk prole is inversely related to the magnitude of pension payments. In the
next section, we shed some light on the drivers of the international capital movements in our
model.
4.1 Deterioration in the net foreign assets position
Figure 2 takes a closer look at the home countrys net foreign asset position as a function
of the social security tax level; more specically, we plot the four histograms of the variable
NFAh=GDP h for the model calibrations considered above. The two reasons for the consis-
tent deterioration in NFA are the wealth e¤ect on the home consumer and the precautionary
savings motive of the foreign households.
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Table 4: Volatility of international asset positions of the home economy
Home lump sum tax Th
0:00 0:10 0:28 0:47
GALh=GDP h 0.0232 0.0261 0.0312 0.0373
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007)
NEh=GDP h 0.0233 0.0225 0.0223 0.0234
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
NDh=GDP h 0.0000b 0.0028 0.0079 0.0139
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
NFAh=GPDh 0.0233 0.0249 0.0291 0.0356
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008)
PRh 0.1215 0.1029 0.0795 0.0644
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0011)
Notes. (a): Standard errors in parentheses.
(b): all statistics except those marked with the superscript b are signicant at the 1 percent
level.
(c): volatility is measured as standard deviation.
The primary mechanism driving domestic dissaving is the wealth e¤ect of the pension
system on the young cohort in both the rst and the second periods of their lives. During
the working period, the home consumers after-tax wage falls, causing a decrease in the level
of current savings (or, more specically, an increase in current borrowing from abroad). A
guaranteed pension payment during the second period of the home workers life amplies
his desire to borrow as he smooths the increase in the lifetime wealth by transferring some
of his future income into the present period. It is worth noting that the ability to use the
future expected pension benets as collateral, captured by (11), increases the home workers
borrowing limit vis-à-vis the unsecured debt case.
At this point it is very important to note that both equity and debt liabilities increase in
the same proportion, since we have assumed a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function. Thus, the pure wealth e¤ect induces a change in the level of the home countrys
NFA without a¤ecting the overall riskiness of its portfolio. In the next section, we discuss
the second e¤ect of the pension system which we dub the risk-rebalancing e¤ect that does
cause a change in the equity-bonds portfolio composition.13
The second reason for the fall in NFA, well documented in the precautionary savings
literature, arises from the international asymmetry itself. Since the foreign consumer does
not have access to a state pension system, she must save a portion of her wage income
during the rst (working) period to ensure nonzero consumption level during the second
(retirement) period.
13In a related paper, Krueger and Kubler (2006) use a closed-economy framework to study the welfare
impact of a PAYG system when nancial markets are incomplete. The authors reach broadly similar conclu-
sions about the e¤ects of changes in the overall riskiness of lifetime income and of the reduction in workers
disposable income on the resulting savings-consumption patterns.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the home countrys net foreign asset position as a function of the
lump-sum social security tax.
4.2 Increase in portfolio risk prole
The main contribution of our paper is being able to analyze not just the net ows of capital
between countries, but also their composition. Based on the results in Table (3) and illus-
trated in more detail in Figure 3, the existence of a DB PAYG pension system (as well as
the increase in the social security tax Th) alters the home countrys portfolio composition as
captured by the risk measure PRh, making it progressively more risky.
We hypothesize that the primary reason for the rebalancing of the portfolio towards
equity and away from bonds is caused by the change in the level of riskiness of the young
cohorts future income, described in equation (9) with h = 0. As the state-guaranteed
pension benet payment Th increases, the second-period wealth 

h;t
t+1 becomes safer for any
given investment choices
n
bh;th;t; b
h;t
f;t; a
h;t
h;t; a
h;t
f;t
o
. More importantly, the second-period wealth

h;tt+1 of the home workers becomes safer than that of the foreign workers. Since we model
both countries as having the same CRRA coe¢ cient  = 1, the home workers are now willing
to take on some additional risk from the foreign workers by increasing the equity investments
ah;th;t; a
h;t
f;t relative to the benchmark scenario, thereby increasing the price of both home and
foreign equities. This international risk rebalancing e¤ect moves home equity asset holdings
in the opposite direction from the wealth e¤ect discussed above. Nonetheless, Table 3 shows
that the home countrys net equity holdings are still negative: the wealth e¤ect outweighs
the risk rebalancing e¤ect in magnitude.
We test our hypothesis by performing two robustness checks on the parameters controlling
the degree of risk in our model: consumer risk aversion  and the riskiness of the pension
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Figure 3: Distribution of the home countrys portfolio risk measure as a function of the
lump-sum social security tax.
system benets. For ease of comparison, the rst column of Table 5 repeats the results of
the baseline simulation with Th = 0:28. We begin by increasing the CRRA parameter  from
1 to 6, thus making both countries more risk averse (column 2). This change results in only
the portfolio rebalancing e¤ect, since the wealth of the two countries remains unchanged.
Therefore, we would expect the foreign workers to be more eager to sell their equity assets
and invest the proceeds into the relatively more safe bonds, since their expected future
wealth does not have a risk-free component of the government-guaranteed pension payout.
The simulations do indeed support our claim: we see an increase in the home portfolio risk
PRh from 0:10 to 0:16 as the home households respond to falling equity prices by shifting
their investments towards the two stocks and away from bonds. Moreover, the home NFA
falls from  5:78 to  6:34 percent as a result of the increase in the precautionary savings by
the foreign workers.
The second check involves changing the nature of the pension system from DB to DC.
In the model specications so far, we have assumed that the government nances a risk-
free payment to the retirees by garnishing some of the stochastic wage of the workers. It
is precisely through this structure that we are able to generate a reduction in the riskiness
of the second-period income of the home households. However, this setup only partially
resembles the actual structure of PAYG systems: while governments typically guarantee a
certain risk-free level of benets to the pensioners (be it equal across all beneciaries or
linked to their average lifetime earnings), they are nanced through distortionary income
taxes which uctuate with business cycles. Any shortfall between pension payouts and tax
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Table 5: Averages of international asset positions of the home economy for di¤erent degrees
of risk in the model setup.
Model specication
Th= 0:28  = 6  h= 0:36
GALh=GDP h 0.2194 0.2337 0.1507
(0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0009)
NEh=GDP h -0.0182 -0.0120 -0.0343
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
NDh=GDP h -0.0396 -0.0514 -0.0356
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003)
NFAh=GPDh -0.0578 -0.0634 -0.0699
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0011)
PRh 0.1018 0.1578 0.0162
(0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0033)
Notes. (a): Standard errors in parentheses.
(b): all statistics are signicant at the 1 percent level.
receipts is nanced from previous system savings or by current government borrowing. Due
to the computational complexity of solving our model, we only have one endogenous state
variable and therefore require the government budget to balance at all times. Thus, the
risk-free pension payments must be nanced by lump-sum taxes on the young cohort.
To better understand our results, we now completely remove the risk rebalancing e¤ect
from the model by changing the lump-sum tax T h to an ad valorem income tax h. Now,
the pension payments themselves become (counterfactually) risky since they are directly
connected to the uctuating wage rate.14 As the income transfer from the young to the old
cohort no longer reduces the riskiness of the expected future income of home workers and
thereby nullies the risk rebalancing e¤ect, we would expect to see home equity and bond
holdings fall in equal proportion as the result of the negative wealth e¤ect of the rst-period
tax. Column 3 of Table 5 demonstrates exactly that: home workers no longer exhibit a
preference for risky versus risk-free assets, and the portfolio risk prole falls by an order of
magnitude compared with the baseline case.
It is important to note at this point that even though the DC structure of the pension
system makes both parts of the retireesincome volatile, as long as the wage and dividend
processes are not perfectly correlated, it pools labor and asset market risks and reduces the
consumption variance of the retirees vis-à-vis the fully funded voluntary private savings setup
abroad. Therefore, even under the DC specication, the model still generates a marginally
risky international portfolio of the home country. This point is further discussed in Shiller
(1999) and Bohn (2001, 2009).
Based on the above ndings, we can conclude that it is the inherent ability of the PAYG
pension systems to reduce the riskiness of the lifetime earning prole that drives the portfo-
14Since we abstract from modeling labor choice, the ad valorem tax h does not distort the labor market
decisions of the young cohort.
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Table 6: Additional robustness checks
Model specication
Th = 0:28 d;d = 0:7 w;d = 0:457  = 0:8 h = f = 0:65
GALh=GDP h 0.2194 0.2223 0.2190 0.2081 0.2526
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0012)
NEh=GDP h -0.0182 -0.0177 -0.0186 -0.0185 -0.0169
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008)
NDh=GDP h -0.0396 -0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0380 -0.0382
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
NFAh=GPDh -0.0578 -0.0578 -0.0587 -0.0565 -0.0551
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0010)
PRh 0.1018 0.1045 0.1019 0.1041 0.0878
(0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0026)
Averages of home countrys asset positions and portfolio risk. Standard errors reported in
parenthesis.
lio reallocation decisions of the workers and thereby exacerbates the net international asset
position of many developed economies. We can furthermore hypothesize that fully funded
pension systems, in which retirement benets are linked to the aggregate stock market per-
formance, would o¤er a much lower incentive for workers to invest in risky equity. Thus,
the switch from PAYG to a fully funded system contemplated in many countries due to
growing government debt associated with the shortfall of tax revenue in funding existing
pension obligations could result in signicant rebalancing of international portfolios and at
least a partial reversal of the recent trends documented in the introduction.
5 Relative magnitudes of the wealth and the risk-rebalancing
e¤ects
5.1 Robustness checks of the benchmark model
To further test our ndings, below we conduct four additional robustness checks by varying
the values of parameters that can a¤ect the degree of risk (and of risk-sharing) inherent in
our model. The results are presented in Table 6, where the rst column once again shows, for
easier comparison, the results of the baseline calibration with the mid-level home lump-sum
tax Th = 0:28.
We begin by adding a cross-country correlation to the home and foreign dividend processes;
loosely based on the ndings in Quinn and Voth (2008), we set the parameter d;d = 0:7.
The change does not produce any statistically signicant impact on the simulated net asset
positions and on the risk prole of the home economy, as illustrated in column 2 of Table 6.
We do, however, see a marginal (but statistically signicant) increase in the volume of gross
assets and liabilities traded between the two economies. Since a positive correlation between
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the home and foreign endowment processes makes riskiness of the two dividend streams more
substitutable, they both can be useful in hedging the risk inherent in the stochastic wage
process (both at home and abroad).
We also consider the impact of an increase in the within-country correlation between
the wage and dividend processes, which we model by setting h = f = 0:457 based on
the corresponding empirical correlation in the U.S. The wage-dividend correlation primarily
a¤ects the degree of cross-generational rather than cross-country risk sharing: a positive
correlation means higher consumption for both cohorts in good times and vice versa. As
discussed in Krueger and Kubler (2006), a social security system improves consumer welfare
in the face of imperfectly correlated wages and returns to capital and in the presence of
incomplete nancial markets by allowing all generations to pool their labor and capital
incomes. However, since there are only two generations in our model, they cannot use
investment to share income risk with each other (the four assets are only used to share risk
across two periods for a particular age cohort). It is, therefore, not surprising that the change
in this parameter produces virtually no change on the international portfolio allocations on
the home and foreign workers, as reported in column 3.
There is very little agreement in the literature on the appropriate value for the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods, . Bodenstein (2010) provides a summary
of its recent empirical estimates, which range from  3:55 based on macro-level evidence to
0:83 in micro-level empirical studies. Several recent papers have documented the importance
of this parameter for the simulated consumption-real exchange rate correlation and conse-
quently for the degree of international risk-sharing.15 We therefore repeat our simulations
by making home and foreign goods more substitutable, captured by the increase in  from
its benchmark value of 0:33 to 0:8. As column 4 demonstrates, our results do depend on
this parameter value since most of the dynamics in our model are driven by intertemporal
risk-hedging as opposed to intratemporal trade in goods.
Finally, we increase the degree of openness of the two economies by lowering the bias
parameter, , to 0:65. As shown in the last column of Table 6, the simulated net asset
holdings are not signicantly a¤ected by this change either. Smaller degree of home bias,
similar to an increase in cross-country dividend correlation discussed above, makes home
and foreign assets more substitutable. Consequently, gross cross-border asset ows increase
in magnitude, and the portfolio risk indicator PRh decreases slightly.
5.2 Epstein-Zin preferences
Our benchmark model is able to match three of the four empirical regularities reported in
Section 2; it fails to generate the result that countries with more generous social security
systems tend to hold long positions in equity assets. The results of the various simulations
reported in Tables 36 suggest that the inability of the model to generate a positive NEh
value in the home country stems from the too strong wealth e¤ect of the pension system
relative to the risk-rebalancing e¤ect. To test this hypothesis and to bring the simulated
moments in line with the data, we must be able to more carefully calibrate the strengths of
15See, among others, Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008); Enders and Müller (2009); and Mykhaylova and
Staveley-OCarroll (2015).
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the two e¤ects.
The strength of the wealth e¤ect which governs the distribution of the consumers life-
time earnings across the two periods depends on the value of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS). The magnitude of the risk-rebalancing e¤ect, which a¤ects the composi-
tion of the consumers portfolio in the rst period, depends on the degree of risk aversion.
One of the weaknesses of the CRRA parameterization assumed in the utility function spec-
ication (5) is that it conates the (reciprocal of the) EIS and the degree of relative risk
aversion into one parameter . To separate out these two forces, we therefore replace the
CRRA preferences in the utility function with Epstein-Zin (EZ) preferences, which allow for
a greater degree of exibility with regard to consumer attitudes toward within-period risk
and across-period consumption smoothing:
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where  controls relative risk aversion and  represents the inverse of the EIS. This new
utility function results in a di¤erent stochastic discount factor:
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A greater value of  increases the degree of discounting whenever future consumption is
expected to be highly volatile. Setting  < 1 (> 1) makes current and future consumption
substitutes (complements). Note that when  = , the preferences are equivalent to CRRA.
The growing interest in the Epstein-Zin utility function in macroeconomics and nance
literature stems from its success in tting asset return and term premium data.16 Since
the rst-order linearizations of EZ and CRRA preferences are the same, models equipped
with the former can easily match empirical business cycle moments. These macroeconomic
moments are generally una¤ected by the additional higher-order terms introduced by the
EZ preferences, allowing for an additional degree of freedom in matching asset price dynam-
ics. Our solution method does not require linearization and therefore can fully capture the
added impact of risk aversion modeled independently from the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
There is not yet a consensus in the literature on the empirical estimates of the Epstein-
Zin preference parameters  and . The former ranges from 0:5 in Chen et al. (2013) to
10 in Guvenen (2009), and the latter varies from 3 in Li and Smetters (2010) and Amisano
and Tristani (2010) to 930 in Paries and Loublier (2010).Therefore, below we repeat our
calculations from the previous section for several values of these parameters.
Changing the value of one or both of the EZ parameters a¤ects the model outcomes
by changing the strength of the risk rebalancing e¤ect. Table 7 shows the results of our
16A non-exhaustive list of papers in this eld includes Bansal and Yaron (2004), Chen et al. (2013),
Guvenen (2009), and Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
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simulations; we use the DB pension setup with the mid-level value of the lump-sum tax,
Th = 0:28, in all specications. For ease of comparison, the rst column displays the results
of the baseline specication (the CRRA utility function) discussed previously. We begin by
considering the impact of higher risk aversion, while keeping the EIS constant, on the agents
portfolio choices, shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7.
As consumers become more risk averse, ceteris paribus they wish to hold less of risky
equity; this drives down its price and increases the equity premium. The asymmetry in
the overall riskiness of the lifetime income between home and foreign agents, created by the
existence of the pension system in the home country, leads the home consumers to take on
a larger share of the portfolio risk from the foreign agents (as discussed in Section 4). The
only di¤erence here is the magnitude of the portfolio reallocation: lower equity prices allow
home consumers to purchase more equity from foreigners than in the baseline specication
(compare columns 2 and 4 of Table 7). Home net equity holdings increase while net debt
decreases; overall, home portfolio risk rises from 10 to 17 percent as  increases from 1 to
60. Nonetheless, the increase in net equity in not enough to make it a positive quantity.
The last two columns of Table 7 illustrate the impact of an increase in the EIS on the
international capital holdings, which turns out to be nonlinearly related to the degree of
risk aversion . When risk aversion is low (column 5,  = 2), making current and future
consumption more substitutable produces only a very small e¤ect on the holdings of net
equity. In fact, net equity appears to fall, but not by enough to make the change statistically
signicant. Conversely, when risk aversion is high (column 6,  = 60), an increase in EIS
produces a large and signicant impact on portfolio composition. In this specication, net
equity rises enough to become positive.
The reason why changes in EIS produce a larger impact when risk aversion is high is
that agents who take on risk may nd their future consumption very di¤erent from their
current consumption. When substitutability between current and future consumption is low,
consumers wish to avoid large swings in the level of their consumption; therefore, everything
else being equal, they prefer to invest in safe rather than risky assets (compare columns 3 and
5). On the other hand, when substitutability is relatively high ( = 0:5), agents care much
less about intertemporal consumption smoothing and can take advantage of the low equity
prices (generated by an increase in the degree of risk aversion) by taking on the foreigners
portfolio risk and enjoying higher future returns (columns 4 and 6).
Although still subject to some debate, several recent papers have estimated the magnitude
of EIS to be 0:5: Chen et al. (2013), van Binsbergen et al. (2012), and Gruber (2006). Setting
 = 60 puts us in the conservative end of the estimated range of this parameter reported in,
for example, Chen et al. (2013), van Binsbergen et al. (2012), and Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012). Therefore, we can conclude that, for a reasonable parameterization of the EZ utility
function, our model is able to replicate and explain all four of the empirical regularities in
the international capital holdings data, reported in the beginning of the paper.
6 Conclusions and extensions
Motivated by the empirical nding that the magnitude of pension payments induces a sizeable
and statistically signicant reallocation of capital around the globe and a change in the
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Table 7: Epstein-Zin preferences
Model specication: (; )
(1; 1) (2; 1) (60; 1) (2; 0:5) (60; 0:5)
GALh=GDP h 0.2194 0.1906 0.3429 0.2009 0.3522
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0013)
NEh=GDP h -0.0182 -0.0182 -0.0015 -0.0190 0.0071
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0003)
NDh=GDP h -0.0396 -0.0405 -0.0597 -0.0420 -0.0599
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007)
NFAh=GPDh -0.0578 -0.0587 -0.0612 -0.0610 -0.0527
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0010)
PRh 0.1018 0.1225 0.1696 0.1197 0.1900
(0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0002) (0.0040) (0.0007)
Averages of home countrys asset positions and portfolio risk. Standard errors reported in
parenthesis.
international risk prole of the countries in our sample, we build a two-country overlapping
generations model to understand the impact of pension system asymmetries on cross-country
portfolio holdings. The pension system in the home country is modeled as a direct pay-as-
you-go transfer from the young cohort, which earns a stochastic wage and invests a portion
of its earnings into several internationally-traded assets, to the old cohort, which consumes
all of its investment portfolio returns and the pension payment.
Based on the results of the model simulations, we demonstrate that the existence of a
pay-as-you-go pension system impacts both the net foreign asset position and the portfolio
risk prole of the home country. The wealth e¤ects of the system on the young and the old
cohorts cause both the net equity and net debt holdings of the home country to fall, resulting
in a negative net foreign asset position. Additionally, by reducing the riskiness of the future
expected income of the young generation, the introduction of the dened benet pension sys-
tem encourages the workers to nance their equity investments by borrowing from abroad
using debt instruments. As a result, the overall risk prole of the home countrys interna-
tional portfolio increases signicantly. However, since the wealth and the risk rebalancing
e¤ects move home equity investment in opposite directions, the overall net equity position of
the home economy depends on the relative strength of the two channels. By adding reason-
ably calibrated Epstein-Zin preferences to the model, we are able to replicate and explain all
four of the empirical regularities in the patterns of international allocation capital observed
in the data, including the "venture capitalist" (positive net equity accompanied by negative
net debt) portfolio prole of the United States. More broadly, our nding that countries with
larger pension systems tend to have a negative net foreign asset position and a relatively
riskier portfolio composition are robust to changes of several parameter values that a¤ect
the degree of riskiness and of risk-sharing in the model.
In the age of growing globalization, countries can no longer ignore the international
implications of national policies. In a broader sense, our model demonstrates that national
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social security systems are indirectly enabling agents to share risks internationally. While we
leave welfare comparisons to future work, it is interesting to note that back-of-the-envelope
calculations in Shiller (1999) suggest that welfare gains of this cross-border risk-sharing are
much larger than those of the traditional intergenerational risk-sharing typically associated
with PAYG systems.
One of the limitations of our framework, necessitated by the computational complexity of
the model solution, is the assumption of the balanced government budget. In reality, time-
varying tax collections can be supplemented by government borrowing to nance the existing
pension payments that are by design independent of business cycles. It is also important to
generalize our ndings to a setting with a dynamic demographic prole. Given a particular
structure of the government pension system, current workers are likely to condition their
savings choices on the relative size of the younger (childrens) cohort, since the latters
future labor income can determine the generosity of the pension payments to their parents.
We leave the two extensions to future research. Equipped with these additional features,
our model can then be used to address the very interesting and important question of the
impact on the ongoing pension reform in China and India (as well as of the inevitable change
in the U.S. Social Security system) on the reallocation of nancial capital across the globe.
The framework can also be helpful in analyzing global capital reallocation that would result
from the switch, contemplated by many developed and developing economies, from PAYG
to fully funded pension systems.
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A Calibrating the wage and dividend processes
A.1 Moments of time-aggregated series
Suppose a time series process fytg is given by
yt = yyt 1 + "y;t (A.1)
where f"y;tg is white noise distributed as N (0; ";y). By rewriting process (A.1) in its moving
average form yt = "y;t + y"y;t 1 + ::: we obtain V ar (yt) =
2";y
1 2y . We now want to calculate
the variance and autocorrelation of a time-aggregated process fYg, where Y is an n-period
sum of yts: Y = yt + yt+1 + ::: + yt+(n 1). In this appendix, we will use Roman subscripts
t to denote annual series and Greek subscripts  when referring to the 25-year aggregated
sums.
Starting with the simplest case of n = 2, we compute
Corr (Y ; Y+1) = Corr (yt + yt+1; yt+2 + yt+3) ;
which, recursively substituting (A.1), is equal to
Corr (Y ; Y+1) = Corr
 
1 + y

yt + y"t+1;
 
2y + 
3
y

yt +
 
y + 
2
y

"t+1 + y"t+2 + "t+3

:
After simplifying the above expression and following the rules of mathematical induction for
n > 2, we obtain
Corr (Y ; Y+1) =
y
 Pn
i=1 
i 1
y
2
n+ 2
Pn 1
i=1 (n  i) iy
(A.2)
Analogously, we can derive the variance of Y :
V ar (Y ) =
 
n+ 2
Pn 1
i=1 (n  i) iy

2"
1  2y
(A.3)
Finally, we can also compute the correlation between two processes fXg and fYg, where
X is aggregated from fxtg which follows
xt = xxt 1 + "x;t
with f"x;tg  N (0; ";x) and Corr (xt; yt) = :
Corr (X ; Y ) =

 
n+
Pn
i=1 (n  i)
 
ix + 
i
y
 
n+ 2
Pn 1
i=1 (n  i) ix
0:5  
n+ 2
Pn 1
i=1 (n  i) iy
0:5 (A.4)
A.2 Matching the moments to the data
Appendix C.1 lists the denitions of the time series used below, as well as sources of the
data used in our calibration.
Given the empirical labor and capital income (annual) autocorrelations of w = 0:62 and
d = 0:47, we calculate the autocorrelations of the aggregated (over 25 years) wage and
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dividend series using (A.2) to be Corr (W ;W+1) = 0:0438 and Corr (D ; D+1) = 0:0254,
respectively. We then use one of the Markov transition matrix properties to solve for h;w =
f;w from Corr (W ;W+1) = 2h;w   1; we obtain h;d = f;d analogously.
Using (A.3), we aggregate the annual standard deviations of ~wt and ~dt, equal to 2:58 and
4:86 percent, respectively, to obtain V ar (W ) = 0:065 and V ar (D ) = 0:156. To solve for
the high and low values of the wage, Wh;1 and Wh;2, we rst normalize the average wage
realization Wh  12 (Wh;1 +Wh;2) to unity. We then solve for Wh;1 and Wh;2 to match the
volatility of the aggregated labor income series: 
Wh;1  Wh
2
+
 
Wh;1  Wh
2
2
= V ar (W )
We obtain the two dividend realizations, Dh;1 and Dh;2, analogously, except that we
normalize the average dividend Wd to be 0:42, to match the average ratio of (unltered) per
capita real capital to labor income wt
dt
in the U.S. data.
Finally, given Corr

~wt; ~dt

= 0:448, we can calculate w;d  Corr (W ; D ) = 0:457.
Given the above parameters, we model the evolution of the ve exogenous shocks in our
model, fWh;Wf ; Dh; Df ; eg as following a joint Markov transition matrix :
 = (h;w 
f;w +R1)
 (h;d 
f;d +R2)
e
where the 2  2 transition matrices i;j control the evolution of each countrys wage and
(separately) dividends
i;j =

i;;j 1  i;;j
1  i;;j i;;j

for i 2 fh; fg and j 2 fw; dg ,
the home bias shock process is governed by the process e
e =

0:5 0:5
0:5 0:5

;
and the matricesR1 andR2 determine the degree of correlation between the di¤erent shocks.
In our robustness checks, we consider two specications of these correlations. In the rst, we
assume that the two dividend processes are correlated across countries: Corr (Dh; ; Df; ) =
d;d. In this case, R1 = 0 and
R2 =
2664
d;d  d;d  d;d d;d
d;d  d;d  d;d d;d
d;d  d;d  d;d d;d
d;d  d;d  d;d d;d
3775 h;d + f;d   2h;df;d2
Alternatively, we can assume that within each country, the correlation between wages and
dividends is given by Corr (Wh; ; Dh; ) = Corr (Wf; ; Df; ) = w;d. Then
R1 = R2 =
2664
w;d  w;d  w;d w;d
w;d  w;d  w;d w;d
w;d  w;d  w;d w;d
w;d  w;d  w;d w;d
3775 i;w + i;d   2i;wi;d2 for i 2 fh; fg .
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B Solution methodology
The model is solved globally over a compact state space grid, following the methodology
outlined in Stepanchuk and Tsyrennikov (2015). First, we complete the state space as
follows:
zt  fet; wh;t; wf;t; dh;t; df;tg : Z
st 
n
!h;t 1t ; zt
o
: [0; 1]Z
Additionally, we dene the three sets (prices, consumption, and asset positions) of endoge-
nous control variables:
Pt  fqt; ph;t; pf;t; qh;t; qf;t; rr;t; rf;tg : R7+
Ct 
n
ch;tt ; c
h;t 1
t ; c
f;t
t ; c
f;t 1
t
o
: R4+
At 
n
ah;th;t; a
f;t
h;t; a
h;t
f;t; a
f;t
f;t; b
h;t
h;t; b
f;t
h;t; b
h;t
f;t; b
f;t
f;t
o
: R8+
Using the Garcia-Zangwill (1981) redenition of the Lagrange multiplier allows the model
to reach corner solutions
h;+t  max

0; ht
	
f;+t  max
n
0; ft
o
h; t  max

0; ht
	
f; t  max
n
0; ft
o
where ht and 
f
t are the multipliers on the home and foreign borrowing constraints, respec-
tively. When the multipliers are positive, h;+t and 
f;+
t are also positive and 
h; 
t and 
f; 
t
are zero; on the other hand, when the multipliers are negative, both h; t and 
f; 
t become
positive. In none of the model specications (including the robustness check) do the agents
borrowing constraints bind.
We next solve the system of the model equations for (most of) the endogenous variables
in Pt, Ct, and At. The assets market clearing conditions (15) imply that
af;th;t = 1  ah;th;t
ah;tf;t = 1  af;tf;t
The denitions of the CPI, (3) and (4), can be used to solve for home and foreign price of
goods
ph;t =
"
f;t  
 
1  h;t

(qt)

 1
h;t + f;t   1
# 1

pf;t =
"
h;t  
 
1  f;t

(qt)

1 
h;t + f;t   1
# 1

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The denitions of wealth (8) and (9), together with the total wealth of the old cohorts (17),
imply that !f;t 1t = 1  !h;t 1t . We use the old cohortsbudget constraints to solve for their
consumption levels:
ch;t 1t = !
h;t 1
t 

t 1
t + I
h
t
cf;t 1t =
!f;t 1t 

t 1
t
qt
+ Ift
Furthermore, the goods market clearing conditions, (13) and (14), can be used to nd the
young cohortsconsumptions levels:
ch;tt =
1 
h;t + f;t   1
 hf;t (ph;t) 11  Yh;t    1  f;t (qtpf;t) 11  Yf;ti  ch;t 1t
cf;tt =
1 
h;t + f;t   1
 "h;t (pf;t) 11  Yf;t    1  h;tph;tqt
 1
1 
Yh;t
#
  cf;t 1t
We dene the stochastic discount factors for each young cohort:
mh;tt+1 = 
 
ch;tt+1
ch;tt
! 
mf;tt+1 = 
 
cf;tt+1
cf;tt
! 
The rst order conditions with respect to the home holding of the home bond, bh;th;t, and the
foreign holding of the foreign bond, bf;tf;t, respectively, are used to nd the home and foreign
real interest rates:
rh;t =
n
E
h
mh;tt+1
i
+ h; t

ch;tt
o 1
  1
rf;t =
n
E
h
mf;tt+1
i
+ f; t

cf;tt
o 1
  1
Finally, the home and foreign borrowing constraints are rearranged to solve for bh;th;t and b
f;t
f;t,
respectively:
bh;th;t = 
h;+
t  
1
(1 + rh;t)

min fph;t+1 (hwh;t+1 + Th) + qt+1 (1 + rf;t) bh;tf;t +
(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1) a
h;t
h;t + qt+1 (qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1) a
h;t
f;tg
bf;tf;t = 
f;+
t  
1
(1 + rf;t)

min fpf;t+1 ( fwf;t+1 + Tf ) + (1 + rh;t)
qt+1
bf;th;t +
(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1)
qt+1
Af;th;t + (qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1) a
f;t
f;tg
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We dene the function 	() as residual of the remaining Euler equations, of the young
cohortsbudget constraints (6), and of the home bond market clearing condition (16) (the
foreign bond market clearing condition holds by Walraslaw):
0 = E
h
qt+1m
h;t
t+1
i
+ h; t min fqt+1g

ch;tt

  qt
(1 + rf;t)
0 = E
h
(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1)m
h;t
t+1
i
+ h; t min fqh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1g

ch;tt

  qh;t
0 = E
h
qt+1 (qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1)m
h;t
t+1
i
+ h; t min fqt+1 (qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1)g

ch;tt

  qtqf;t
0 = E
"
mf;tt+1
qt+1
#
+ f; t min

1
qt+1

cf;tt

  1
qt (1 + rh;t)
0 = E

(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1)
qt+1
mf;tt+1

+ f; t min

qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1
qt+1

cf;tt

  qh;t
qt
0 = E
h
(qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1)m
f;t
t+1
i
+ f; t min fqf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1g

cf;tt

  qf;t
0 = 
h;tt   ch;tt   bh;th;t   qtbh;tf;t   qh;tah;th;t   qtqf;tah;tf;t   Iht
0 =

f;tt
qt
  cf;tt  
bf;th;t
qt
  bf;tf;t  
qh;t
qt
af;th;t   qf;taf;tf;t   Ift
0 = bhh;t + b
f
h;t
The above nine equations are used to solve for the remaining control variablesn
qt; qh;t; qf;t; a
h;t
h;t; a
f;t
f;t; b
h;t
f;t; b
f;t
h;t; 
h
t ; 
f
t
o
The transition map for the wealth distribution O () is given by
!h;tt+1 =
1

tt+1
[ph;t+1 (hwh;t+1 + Th) + (1 + rh;t) b
h;t
h;t + qt+1 (1 + rf;t) b
h;t
f;t
+(qh;t+1 + ph;t+1dh;t+1) a
h;t
h;t + qt+1 (qf;t+1 + pf;t+1df;t+1) a
h;t
f;t]
The solution grid is dened over the entire state space S using a number of uniform steps,
n, on the home retireeswealth ratio !h;t 1t , such that the step size is
1
n 1 ; thus, the grid
space is n  32. We set n = 11. An initial guess is selected for the policy functions 	();
B-spline interpolation allows us to approximate future values of the wealth distribution,
!h;tt+1, between the grid points. The use of homotopy eliminates the possibly of asset returns
becoming collinear during the minimization procedure outlined in Schmedders (1998). We
iterate on the policy function  (w) until
 i (w)   i 1 (w) < 10 5.
Five additional grids are required to dene future values of
n
qt+1; qh;t+1; qf;t+1; c
h;t
t+1; c
f;t
t+1
o
over the state st+1. Initial guesses for these grids are calculated using the average values of
all ve shocks.
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C Data sources and description
C.1 Calibration
All data are taken from The Bureau of Economic Analysis and refer to the 19472013 period
annual U.S. variables.
Wt: Compensation of employees, paid, billions of dollars. Table 1.10, line 2.
Dt: Net operating surplus, billions of dollars. Table 1.10, line 9.
RGDPct: Real gross domestic product per capita, chained 2009 dollars. (Via the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database, series ID: A939RX0Q048SBEA).
GDPt: Gross domestic product, billions of dollars. (Via the FRED database, series ID:
GDP).
We compute the real per capita labor and capital income series as wt = tWt and
dt = tDt, where t = RGDPctGDPt . To remove the long-run growth trend, in the calibration
section we use the HP-ltered series ~wt, and ~dt, calculated as the ratios of the cyclical to the
trend components of wt and dt: ~wt =
wcyclicalt
wtrendt
and ~dt =
dcyclicalt
dtrendt
.
C.2 Empirical exercises
Sample countries (151): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cam-
bodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia,
Congo, Dem. Rep., Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indone-
sia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea,
Rep., Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanza-
nia, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zam-
bia, Zimbabwe.17
The four measures of capital stocks are taken from the External Wealth of Nations Mark
II database, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). All data are for the year 2010, reported in
billions of current U.S. dollars.
Gross holdings of assets and liabilities (GAL) is the sum of total assets and total
liabilities of each country. Total assets is the sum of FDI assets, portfolio equity assets, and
17Due to missing observations, the total number of countries in our regression dropped to 110.
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debt assets plus FX reserves minus gold. Total liabilities are calculated analogously.
Net Equity (NE) is calculated as portfolio equity assets + FDI assets - portfolio equity
liabilities - FDI liabilities.
Net Debt (ND) is computed as Debt assets (portfolio debt + other investment) - Debt
liabilities (portfolio debt + other investment).
Net Foreign Assets (NFA) measures the di¤erence between a countrys total assets
and total liabilities.
PSgdp: Total public pension spending as a percent of GDP. World Bank HDNSP pen-
sions database, data for the most recent available year, ranging from 2000 (Iran) to 2012
(Colombia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Peru, Qatar, Tunisia).
GDPcPPP : GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity, current international
dollars, 2010. World Bank DataBank, series code NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD.
Population (POP ): Total population, 2010. World Bank DataBank, series code SP.POP.TOTL.
Pension Spending (PS): Total pension spending, billions of current international dol-
lars. Calculated as PSgdpGDPcPPP  POP  10 9.
GDP adjusted for PPP (GDPppp): Total GDP based on purchasing power parity,
billions of current international dollars. Calculated as GDPcPPP  POP  10 9.
Life Expectancy (LEm, LEw): Life expectancy at birth, years (data for men and
women), 2009/2010. Social Security Administration "Social Security Programs Throughout
the World."
Contributions (CONT ): Contribution rates for old age, disability, and survivors social
security programs (percent of earnings), 2009/2010. Social Security Administration "Social
Security Programs Throughout the World."
Retirees (RETc): Number of people aged 65 and older relative to total population,
2010. World Bank HDNSP pensions database.
Coverage (COV ): Pension system coverage, dened as the total number of active con-
tributors relative to the working age population, 2013. World Bank HDNSP pensions data-
base.
The index of nancial freedom (HFI): "Financial freedom is a measure of banking
e¢ ciency as well as a measure of independence from government control and interference
in the nancial sector. State ownership of banks and other nancial institutions such as
insurers and capital markets reduces competition and generally lowers the level of available
services. The Index scores an economys nancial freedom by looking into the following ve
broad areas: the extent of government regulation of nancial services; the degree of state
intervention in banks and other nancial rms through direct and indirect ownership; the
extent of nancial and capital market development; government inuence on the allocation
of credit; and openness to foreign competition." Heritage Foundation Index of Economic
Freedom, data for 2010. We collapse the data into ve categories, ranging in value from
1 to 5, by combining the adjacent levels of government interference: thus, a value of 1
(original index levels of 10 through 20) now represents repressive governments, while a value
of 5 (original index levels of 90 through 100) is assigned to countries with very low levels
of government interference in the market. Index of Economic Freedom, available online at
http://www.heritage.org/index.
Trade Volume (V OL): the sum of a countrys imports and exports of goods and ser-
vices, measured in billions of current U.S. dollars, 2010. World Bank DataBank (series
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Net Equity (NE) -10.35 314.53 -1481.44 3004.39 151
Net Debt (ND) -61.26 543.54 -5853.74 1567.82 151
Net Foreign Assets (NFA) -32.80 385.73 -2617.58 2884.83 151
Panel B: Control Variables
Total pension spending, PPP (PS) 2906.93 10206.41 0.0009 101716.40 147
GDP, PPP (GDPppp) 501.05 1544.28 0.46 14958.40 147
Life expectancy, men (LEm) 68.43 8.84 47.20 80.80 134
Life expectancy, women (LEw) 73.34 9.97 49.70 87.20 134
Contribution rates (CONT ) 15.70 8.73 0.00 38.50 132
Financial Freedom Index (HFI) 2.86 0.99 1 5 146
CEES dummy (CEES) 0.21 0.62 0 1 151
Net exports of oil (OIL) -0.0006 0.26 -0.96 2.17 151
Volume of trade (V OL) 204.68 496.49 0.20 4191.73 145
OPEC dummy (OPEC) 0.06 0.24 0 1 151
Retirees/Population (RetPop) 7.99 5.38 1.04 21.95 151
Pension coverage (COV ) 0.33 0.26 0.004 0.94 136
Population (POP ), log 15.88 1.92 10.83 20.99 151
The three dependent variables, total pension spending, GDP, and the volume of trade are
measured in billions of current dollars (either U.S. or international). Net oil exports are
measured in billions of barrels per day.
BX.GSR.GNFS.CD for exports, series BM.GSR.GNFS.CD for imports).
CEEC Indicator (CEEC): Dummy variable identifying the countries in the Central
and Eastern Europe and post-communist block categories: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mace-
donia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
and Ukraine.
OPEC (OPEC): Dummy variable identifying the member countries of the OPEC group:
Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and Venezuela.
Oil Exports (OIL): Total exports less total imports of rened petroleum products,
billions of barrels per day, 2010. U.S. Energy Information Administration (www.eia.gov)
International Energy Statistics.
Notes: Missing RetPop data for Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Seychelles, and St.
Kitts and Nevis are taken from the Social Security Administration "Social Security Programs
Throughout the World," 2009/2010.
38
